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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CITY OF ST. GEORGE,

]

Plaintiff and Appellant, ]
)

vs .
STEVEN REESE CARTER,

Case No. 960704-CA

]

Defendant and Appellee.

Priority No. 15

]

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

L

JimisnxcriDN

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. Sections 77-18a-l(2)(a) (Supp. 1996) and 78-2a3(2)(f) (Supp. 1996), and in accordance with Rule 26, Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure and State v. Trover, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah
1993) .
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II-

ISSUES PRESENTED

(A) Did the district court err in concluding that when
Officer Whipple's encounter with the defendant, prior to having
him exit his vehicle, disclosed no supporting evidence of a
crime, there was no legal basis for Officer Whipple's subsequent
actions?
The district court's legal conclusions are reviewed for
correctness.

State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1186

(Utah 1995) .

This issue arose out of the district court's ruling on the
defendant's Motion to Suppress.

R. 143-47.

(B) Did the district court err in concluding that any
evidence which was developed after Officer Whipple asked the
defendant to exit the vehicle was obtained in violation of the
Defendant's constitutional guarantees of freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures?
The district court's legal conclusions are reviewed for
correctness.

State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1186

(Utah 1995).

This issue arose out of the district court's ruling on the
defendant's Motion to Suppress.

R. 143-47.
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DETERMINATIVE
Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution
Article I, Section 14, Utah Constitution
Utah Code Ann., Section 77-7-15 (1995)
IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
This is a Troyer appeal from the district court's order

suppressing evidence and the conclusions of law on which that
order is based.
On January 13, 1995, the plaintiff filed an Information
charging the defendant with committing the following crimes: (1)
driving under the influence of alcohol; (2) possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana); (3) open container; and (4)
possession of paraphernalia.

R. 1-2.

Around April 7, 1995, the defendant moved the district court
for an order suppressing all physical evidence and observations
made in connection with the defendant's stop and detention on the
grounds that he was stopped, detained, and ordered out of his
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vehicle in violation of his constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.

R. 14-15.

On June 12, 1996, a hearing was held on the defendant's
Motion to Suppress.

R. 143.

At the close of the hearing, the

district court made the following conclusions of law:
(1)

Officer Whipple acted within the scope of his authority

and duty in approaching the defendant's vehicle, signaling that
the defendant should not leave his position, and in approaching
the vehicle and talking to the occupants.
(2)

When the officer's encounter with the occupants of the

vehicle, prior to having them exit the vehicle, disclosed no
supporting evidence of the commission of any public offense,
there was no legal basis for the officer's subsequent actions.
(3)

Any evidence which developed after the officer asked

the occupants to step out of the vehicle was obtained in
violation of the defendant's constitutional guarantees of freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures.

R. 146.

Based on the foregoing conclusions of law, the district
court ordered that all observations, analyses, and items of
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physical evidence made, conducted, or seized after the defendant
was required to exit his motor vehicle be suppressed.

R. 146-47.

On October 4, 1996, the district court, pursuant to State v.
Trover, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1993), dismissed the charges against
the defendant with prejudice on the grounds that the district
court's order granting the defendant's Motion to Suppress
substantially impaired the plaintiff's case.

R. 154, 148-153;

State v. Trover, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1993).
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR
REVIEW
On Friday, September 30, 1994, Ricky Hafen was working as an

employee of the Arby's Restaurant located at the corner of 700
South and Bluff Street in St. George, Utah.

While working at the

drive-through window that evening, he observed the defendant in
the driver's seat of a motor vehicle.

R. 143.

The occupants of the vehicle purchased food from the Arby's
Restaurant and then proceeded on to the public street.

While the

vehicle was still outside the drive-through window, Mr. Hafen
observed an open can of Keystone beer in the defendant's lap.
Furthermore, he saw the defendant take a drink from that can as
he left the drive-through window and proceeded toward the public
5

street.

At that time, the can appeared to be half full.

Hafen

watched the vehicle until it pulled into the public street, and
he did not see the defendant throw the Keystone beer can out of
the vehicle.

R. 144.

Hafen called police dispatch to report his observations.
Hafen told dispatch that there was a driver who just left the
Arby's drive-through window who had an open container.

Hafen

ultimately provided the location and a description of the vehicle
which included the license plate number.

Hafen did not receive

any consideration from the St. George Police Department for
providing this information.

Officer Whipple was the first

officer to arrive at the scene.

He recalled that dispatch

broadcast the following information: (1) there was a possible
open container subject at the Arby's Restaurant; (2) an Arby's
employee had seen an open container in a vehicle; (3) the vehicle
left the drive-through window; (4) the vehicle was a small white
compact pickup with a shell on it; and (5) there were two
occupants in the vehicle.

The foregoing description matched the

general description of the vehicle the defendant was driving.
Officer Whipple did not recall the broadcast of any information
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indicating that the vehicle had parked on 700 South after leaving
the restaurant.

R. 144-46.

Officer Whipple approached Arby's from Bluff Street and
proceeded eastbound on 700 South.

He observed that the vehicle

which dispatch had described was not in the area of the Arby's
drive-through window.

He observed the defendant's vehicle on 700

South and drove past it in order to see if he could make any
further observations which would indicate whether or not it was
the vehicle described in the radio dispatch.

After observing two

occupants in the vehicle eating, Officer Whipple determined to
contact the individuals.

He positioned his patrol car behind the

defendant's vehicle and turned on the overhead lights.

R. 14 5.

Officer Whipple approached the vehicle and contacted the
driver who was eating food which had obviously been purchased
from the Arby's Restaurant.

Officer Whipple told the occupants

of the vehicle why he was there and asked them if they had been
drinking and if they had any open alcoholic beverage containers
in the vehicle.
containers.

They denied drinking and denied having any such

R. 145.
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Officer Whipple could not observe any such containers from
his vantage point outside the vehicle.

He did not smell the odor

of any alcoholic beverage but could smell the aroma of the food
which the occupants of the vehicle were eating.

Officer Whipple

did not, with any of his senses, detect anything which confirmed
the presence of an open container in the vehicle or which led him
to believe that there was any criminal conduct afoot.

He asked

the occupants for identification and ran the information through
dispatch.
right.

He then concluded that everything seemed to be all

R. 145-46.

At that point, Officer Whipple asked the occupants to step
out of the vehicle because he wanted to see if he could detect
the odor of alcohol on their breath when they were separated from
the food aroma.

Once the defendant was outside the vehicle

engaging in conversation with Officer Whipple, Officer Whipple
detected the slight odor of alcohol.

It was this observation

which led to the escalation of the investigation and the
defendant's arrest.

R. 146.
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V,

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Officer Whipple's initial seizure was an investigative level
two stop.

A level two stop must meet the following two-prong

Terry test to overcome the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable seizures: (1) the initial stop must be justified by
reasonable suspicion; and (2) the police officer's actions after
the stop must be within the scope of the circumstances justifying
the stop.
In the present case, it should be assumed for the purposes
of this appeal that the first prong of the Terry test was met
(the initial stop was supported by reasonable suspicion that the
defendant had an open container in the vehicle).
Therefore, the only question which is determinative to the
issues presented in this appeal deals with the second prong of
the Terry test:

Were Officer Whipple's actions after the stop

within the scope of the circumstances justifying the stop?

The

answer to that question is yes.
In determining whether the detention after a level two stop
exceeds the scope of the circumstances justifying the stop, the
Court has: (a) balanced the need for the detention against the

9

invasion which the detention entails; and (b) determined whether
the police officer diligently pursued a means of investigation
that was likely to confirm or dispel his suspicions quickly.
In the instant case, the need for the detention (separating
the defendant from the food aroma to see if the odor of an
alcohol beverage could be detected) outweighs the invasion which
the detention entailed (the defendant exiting the vehicle).
Furthermore, Officer Whipple diligently pursued a means of
investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel his suspicions
quickly.
Therefore, Officer Whipple's actions after the stop were
within the scope of the circumstances justifying the stop, and
Officer Whipple's seizure of the defendant was lawful.

10

YI^_ARGDMENT
OFFICER WHIPPLE'S INVESTIGATIVE LEVEL TWO SEIZURE OF THE
DEFENDANT WAS LAWFUL BECAUSE: (A) THE STOP WAS JUSTIFIED BY
REASONABLE SUSPICION; AND (B) OFFICER WHIPPLE'S ACTIONS AFTER THE
STOP WERE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING THE
STOP.
In the present case, Officer Whipple seized the defendant
based on reasonable suspicion that the defendant had an open
alcohol container in his vehicle in violation of Utah Code Ann.
41-6-44.20.

S^e R. 143-46.

level two stop.

This seizure was an investigative

See State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah

1987) (per curiam); Utah Code Ann. Section 77-7-15 (1995)
(codification of level two stop); R. 143-46.
A level two stop must meet the following two-prong Terry
test to overcome the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable seizures: (A) the initial stop must be justified by
reasonable suspicion; and (B) the police officer's actions after
the stop must be within the scope of the circumstances justifying
the stop.

State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994)

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)).
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A.

The Stop Was Justified by Reasonable Suspicion.

In the present case, it should be assumed for the purposes
of this appeal that the first prong of the lexry test was met
(the initial stop was supported by reasonable suspicion that the
defendant had an open container in the vehicle) . See R. 143-46.1
Therefore, the only question which is determinative to the
issues presented in this appeal deals with the second prong of
the Terry test:

Were Officer Whipple's actions after the stop

within the scope of the circumstances justifying the stop?

As

the following discussion illustrates, the answer to that question
is yes.
B.

Officer Whipple's Actions After the Stop Were Within
the Scope of the Circumstances Justifying the Stop.

There is no bright-line rule for determining whether the
detention after a level two stop is within the scope of the
circumstances justifying the stop; instead, the Court, in making

At the close of the suppression hearing, the district
court made the following conclusion of law: "Officer Whipple
acted within the scope of his authority and duty in approaching
the Defendant's vehicle, signaling that the defendant should not
leave his position, and in approaching the vehicle and talking to
the occupants." R. 4. There has been no appeal related to this
conclusion of law.
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this determination, has: (1) balanced the need for the detention
against the invasion which the detention entails; and (2)
determined whether the police officer "diligently pursued a means
of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain
the defendant."

State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah App.

19 91) (w'common sense and ordinary human experience must govern
over rigid criteria'") (quoting State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880,
884 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S.
675, 685 (1985)); Statft v. Qttesen, 920 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah App.
1996) (citing T^rry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
1.

The need for the detention outweighed the invasion
which the detention entailed.

In the present case, once there was reasonable suspicion
that the defendant had an open container in his vehicle, Officer
Whipple had not only the right but the duty to investigate to
confirm or dispel that suspicion.

State v. Baumgartel, 762 P.2d

2, 5 (Utah App. 1988).
Officer Whipple's initial contact with the defendant (he
approached the vehicle, contacted the occupants, told them why he
was there, asked them if they had been drinking or if they had
13

any open containers) did not yield any evidence of an open
container.

R. 145-46.

Officer Whipple could not smell the odor

of any alcoholic beverage, but he could smell the aroma of the
Arby's food the defendant and his passenger were eating.

R. 145.

Officer Whipple wanted to see if he could detect the odor of
alcohol on the Defendant's breath when he was separated from the
food aroma so he had him exit the vehicle.

R. 14 6.

This was

necessary because the aroma of the food was masking the odor of
alcohol.

£Lee. R. 145-46.

The need to determine whether there was

an open container in the vehicle is heightened by public safety
concerns related to people drinking alcohol in vehicles on
highways, and, again, at the time of the initial stop, there was
reasonable suspicion that the defendant had an open container in
his vehicle.
In the present case, the "invasion" which the detention
entailed is simply the defendant exiting his vehicle.

R. 146.

The United States Supreme Court has characterized the
intrusion of having a person exit their vehicle after they have
been lawfully stopped as:

"de minimis;" "not a 'serious

intrusion upon the sanctity of the person;'" "hardly ris[ing] to

14

the level of a 'petty indignity;'" and a "mere inconvenience."
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (citation
omitted).
In Minims, two police officers stopped a driver for driving a
car with an expired license plate.
the driver to exit the car.

One of the officers ordered

When the driver exited the car, the

officer noticed a bulge under the driver's jacket which turned
out to be a firearm.
weapons violations.

The driver was eventually convicted of
Xd. at 107-08.

The Supreme Court, in

deciding whether the order to exit the car was reasonable and
thus permissible under the Fourth Amendment, balanced the
officer's interest in having the driver exit the car against the
intrusion which resulted from the order to exit the car.
109-111.

Id. at

The state argued that, although the officer did not

suspect foul play from the driver at the time of the stop, it was
the officer's practice, as a precautionary measure, to have
drivers exit their cars whenever they had been stopped for a
traffic violation.

Id. at 110.

The Supreme Court, after giving

the foregoing characterization of the intrusion of being ordered
to exit the car, ruled that such an intrusion ucannot prevail

15

when balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer's
safety."

Xd.

The Court went on to state: "We only hold that

once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detai[n]ed for a traffic
violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of
the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment's proscription
of unreasonable searches and seizures."

Xd. at n.6.2

The Court's analysis and holding in Mimms supports the
conclusion that, in the present case, the need for the detention
outweighed the invasion which the detention entailed, and Officer
Whipple's actions after the stop were lawful.
2.

Officer Whipple diligently pursued a means of
investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel
his suspicions quickly.

After his initial contact with the defendant did not yield
any evidence of an open container, Officer Whipple wanted to see
if he could detect the odor of alcohol on the Defendant's breath
when he was separated from the food aroma which was coming from
the vehicle in which the defendant was seated; therefore, he had

This statement was made in response to a suggestion in
Justice Stevens' dissent that the Supreme Court was holding that
whenever an officer has occasion to speak to a driver, the
officer may order the driver out of the car. Xd.
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the defendant exit the vehicle.

R. 146.

This was clearly a means of investigation that was likely to
confirm or dispel Officer Whipple's suspicions quickly, and
Officer Whipple pursued those means in a diligent and reasonable
manner.
In sum, Officer Whipple's actions after the initial stop
were within the scope of the circumstances justifying the stop,
and Officer Whipple's seizure of the defendant was lawful.
VII,

^CONCLUSION

Officer Whipple's investigative level two seizure of the
defendant was lawful because: (a) the stop was justified by
reasonable suspicion; and (b) Officer Whipple's actions after the
stop were within the scope of the circumstances justifying the
stop.
Therefore, the plaintiff respectfully requests this Court
to:

(a) reverse the district court's order suppressing all

evidence that was developed after Officer Whipple had the
defendant exit his vehicle; (b) reverse the district court's
order dismissing the charges against the defendant; and (c)
remand the present case for further proceedings.
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DATED this

1I

day of February, 1997.

?
Paul E. Dame
City Prosecutor

Certificate of Delivery
On the
/
day of
ptAr
, 1997, I caused two true
and exact copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be
delivered to Gary W. Pendleton, 150 North 200 East, Suite 202,
St. George, Utah.

M

<i/?*~

Paul E. Dame
City Prosecutor

Certificate of Delivery
I hereby certify that on the
/
day of
c+^r*
1997, one original and seven copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLANT were mailed, first class postage prepaid, to Robin
Hutcheson, Deputy Clerk, Utah Court of Appeals, 230 South 500
East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102.
/ /

^ -

Paul E. Dame
City Prosecutor
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the d e f e n d a n t exit the v e h i c l e .

P.

Mh.

T h i s was cieaily ,i nii'.-nin D1 J. nvest igat ii »ii that

vet." ! i I: 1; I

c o n f i r m or dispel O f f i c e r Whipple's suspicions quickly,

and

O f f i c e r W h i p p l e p u r s u e d those means :i i i a d:i I i gent: ai id r easoi lable
manner.
In sum., O t t i c e r W h i p p l e ' s actions atter the initial

stop

were w i t h i n the scope of the c i r c u m s t a n c e s justifying the stop,
and O f f i c e r W h i p p l e ' s seizure of the defendai it was l a w f u l .
VII,

CONCLUSION

O f f i c e r W h i p p l e ' s investigative level two seizure of the
d e f e n d a n t w a s lawful b e c a u s e :
r e a s o n a b l e s u s p i c i o n ; and

(a) the stop was j u s t i f i e d by

(b) O f f i c e r W h i p p l e ' s actions a f t e r the

s t op w e r e w i t: h :il i 1 t he s c op e c f 11 i 2 c ire urns tances j u s t i f y i ng the
stop.
Therefore
to:

r h^ | < 1 .1 i nt i. P f respectful 1 y requests this Court

(a) r e v e r s e the district court's o r d e r suppressing all

e -<;r i d e n c e t h a t w a s d e A e ] o p e d a f t e r Officer W h i p p 1 e had
defendant exit his vehicle;

the

(b) reverse the district court's

order d isi ai ssii lg t:l HE ::1: larges agai nst the d e f e n d a n t ; and
r e m a n d the p r e s e n t case for further p r o c e e d i n g s .

( :::)

DATED this

H

day of February, 1997,

,/*/ 2 ^
Paul E. Dame
City Prosecutor
Certificate of Delivery
On the
V
day of ^f^fiLdrJ
, 1997, I caused two true
and exact copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be
delivered to Gary W. Pendleton, 150 North 200 East, Suite 202,
St. George, Utah.
^V^t^tvi

Li &'aj Bunding

C e r t i f i c a t e of Delivery
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t on the

H

day of rtbfXJLct^x

RlE OF
1997, one original and seven copies of the foregoing BRtfEF
APPELLANT were mailed, first class postage prepaid, to Robin
Hutcheson, Deputy Clerk, Utah Court of Appeals, 230 South 500
East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102.
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ADDENDUM

Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution
[Unreasonable s e a r c h e s and seizures.] The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 14, Utah State Constitution
[Unreasonable searches forbidden--Issuance of warrant.] The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
Utah Code Annotated, 1.9 95, Section 7 7 7- 15.
Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect-Grounds.
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when
he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is
in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public
offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of
his actions.

Aj
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GARY G. KUHLMANN #4 994
PAUL E. DAME #5828
Attorneys for Plaint •' ef
City of St. George
175 East 200 North
St. George, Utah 84; .
Telephone: (801) 634-5800

w A S H i N j r o : ; COUNTY

BY

rfm

:~/c F::FTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
.UN'i. ,. r1 WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
1'ir

<i r\

i .-.. .-

E,

FINDINGS OF FACT .AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

Plaint:.:: ,

Case No. 955500015 TC
Judge James L. Shumate

STE\ EI I REESE CA RTEF .,

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on June 12,
1996, on Defendant's motion to suppress.
through Paul Dame, city Prosecutur

The City appeared by and

DetendcMiL appeared in fa::rj» n

and through counsel, Gary W. Pendleton.

The Court, having heard

the 1-'?:--, t i ninny i,l Pi'*ky Hafen and Officer Jason Whipple and the
arguments of counsel, and being

!;uJly advj.'.^jd

in the [JI eiiiJ b^L.,

makes the following:
FI1 IDINGS ur "ACT
1,

On Friday, September

;

n

*•QC . Ricky Hafen was work] i lg as

an erp:cv-{, •;: f the Arby • s Restaurant located at the corner of 700
£ "•

: i S t r e e t :i i i S t:

G< sorge, Utah.

Whi le working at the

drive-through window that evening,, he observed the Defendant :i i I tl le
driver's seat of a motor vehicle.

2.

The occupants of the vehicle purchased food from the

Arbyfs Restaurant and then proceeded on to the public street.
While the vehicle was still outside the drive-through window, Mr.
Hafen observed an open can of Keystone beer in the Defendant's lap.
Furthermore, he saw the Defendant take a drink from that can as he
left the drive-through window and proceeded toward the public
street.

At that time, the can appeared to be half full.

Hafen

watched the vehicle until it pulled into the public street, and he
did not see the Defendant throw the Keystone beer can out of the
vehicle.
3.

Hafen

called

the police

dispatcher

to

report his

observations. Hafen told dispatch that there was a driver who just
left the Arby's drive-through window who had an open container.
Hafen ultimately provided the location and a description of the
vehicle which included the license plate number. Hafen did not
receive any consideration from the St. George Police Department for
providing this information.
to arrive at the scene.

Officer Whipple was the first officer

He recalled that dispatch broadcast the

following information: (a) there was a possible open container
subject at the Arby's Restaurant; (b) an Arby's employee had seen
an open container in a vehicle; © the vehicle left the drivethrough window; (d) the vehicle was a small white compact pickup
with a shell on it; and (e) there were two occupants in the
vehicle.

The foregoing description matched the general description

of the vehicle the Defendant was driving.

2

Officer Whipple did not
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recall the troadcast of any information indicating that the vehicle
i outn attei. ledvuig the rei: t "iur ant.

had parked en /
I:

Whipple approached Arby's from Bluff Street and proceeded

eistbouriil

" 'firnth.

He

observed

that

dispatch had described was not in the arj.i ui
througti window.
aiii

1 r v-*

pi

f

the

vehicle

which

i In:' Arb;- ';. •:' :". /e-

He observed the Defendant's vehicle on 7 00 South
i1'

• r!r• f• to see if he could make any further

observations which would indicate whether or not i I. wau Lliu vehicle
described In the radio dispatch.
the

vehic Le eaI: i ii-.j

individuals.

After observing two occupants in

0f f i<:er' Wh Ipp le determined

r o contact

the

He positioned his patrol car behind the Uetenda.:.

vehicle and turned on the overhead lights.
Whippie dppi oaehed L11e ,/ehioJ e arui «">"mtacted the driver
who was eating food which had obviously been purchased from the
Arby's Restaurant.

TIV officer told the occupants of the vehicle

why he was there and asked U

I II

d inVLno ,MV1 if

they had any open alcoholic beverage containers
They denim drinHnq
ii.

in«l denied having any such containers.

'The officer could not observe any tiiiUi "mi* i intio trum 1M i

vantage point outside* the vehicle.

He did not nniell the odor or

any a I coh d • ' b«iv°raiv"' but could smell fh^ ar(^\i
the occupants o f t h« s v e h i c 1 e were e a t i i l g
with

any

preseni'i

in the vehicle.

of
n

his

senses, detect

anything

of the food which
' I' In"

which

Df f icei

confirmed

:i 1 I i I • : t ,
the

»n op".MI '' n n t: a i ne r in the vehicle or which led him to

believe that there was any criminal conduct afoot,

3

He asked LI if
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occupants for identification and ran the information through
dispatch.
7.

He then concluded that everything seemed to be alright.
At that point, he asked the occupants to step out of the

vehicle because he wanted to see if he could detect the odor of
alcohol on their breath when they were separated from the food
aroma.

Once the Defendant was outside the vehicle engaging in

conversation with Officer Whipple, the officer detected the slight
odor of alcohol.

It was this observation which lead to the

escalation of the investigation and Defendant's arrest.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Officer Whipple acted within the scope of his authority

and duty in approaching the Defendant's vehicle, signaling that the
Defendant should not leave his position, and in approaching the
vehicle and talking to the occupants.
2.

When the officer's encounter with the occupants of the

vehicle, prior to having them exit the vehicle, disclosed no
supporting evidence of the commission of any public offense, there
was no legal basis for the officer's subsequent actions.
3.

Any evidence which developed after the officer asked the

occupants to step out of the vehicle was obtained in violation of
the

Defendant's

constitutional

guarantees

of

freedom

from

unreasonable searches and seizures.
LET AN ORDER BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
ORDER SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE
Based on the foregoing Findings and Fact and Conclusions of
Law,
4
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• T sica_ e v : a - j n c e mc . U C

itenj;
Defend a n t

wa s

r e qu i r e d

(
:
::

/

V_

seized

= ::: : i t 1 :i i s in o t o r

after

veh i c ] e

are

^

suppressed.
DATED this

f

-"Y

clay o f A u g u s t , 1 9 9 6 .

Jam^^irr Shumate
District Court Judge

APPROVED:

Gary W.\Pendldton
Attorney l o r defendant

i*

&.

Paul E. Dame
Attorney for Plaintiff
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